State long-arm statutes:
- Does the Due Process clause authorize PJ or does it limit PJ?
- If the Due Process clause does not authorize PJ, might that explain why state legislatures enact “long-arm” statutes?
- How is PJ measured in a state court?
- Should one analyze only Due Process?
- Should one analyze only the long-arm statute?
- Should one analyze both?
- How does the California long-arm statute differ from the Illinois/New York long-arm statutes?
- See the discussion of the New York long-arm in Bensusan. If the court had interpreted the statute using the rationale of Gray (page 316), would there have been PJ?
- See the long-arm table below. Do all types of long-arms have the same scope?
- Suppose that a state adopts LA-4 (PJ over anyone alive) from the handout. Assume P (Florida) sues D (Alaska) in Florida state court for a tort occurring in Alaska. Is there PJ under the long-arm? Is Due Process satisfied? Is there PJ?
- Note that in addition to long-arm statutes, states often have specialized jurisdictional statutes such as the motorist jurisdiction statute in Hess.
- Why would a state create an enumerated long-arm statute that doesn’t reach to the full extent of what is permitted by the Due Process clause?
|Due Process: The Due Process Clause (DP) provides the outer limits for the exercise of PJ. If PJ falls outside of DP, then it’s unconstitutional.
State long arm statutes: A state long-arm statute (LA) is a statute that authorizes a state’s courts to exercise personal jurisdiction (PJ) over a person or entity. If PJ falls outside of the LA, then there’s no PJ.
Analyze both DP and LA: Analysis of just the state LA is insufficient; instead, to find PJ, both the long-arm statute and Due Process must be satisfied. You gotta satisfy both.
What about federal court? We’ll soon learn that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) instructs federal courts to analyze PJ in federal court the same as the corresponding state court: LA + DP. But Rule 4 has extra bases for PJ that we’ll study later.
The chart to the left provides four examples of hypothetical long-arm statutes and how they relate to Due Process under the 14th amendment.
Chart based in part on Glannon E&E. Converted to WordPress Sept. 11, 2015
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
- Which Due Process clause applies against the states? The federal government? The Fifth or the Fourteenth?
- Which Due Process clause would permit broader assertions of PJ? The Fifth or the Fourteenth? Why? Hint: even today, we consider territory in analyzing PJ. Which territory is bigger? That of a state or of the USA?
The basic rule for PJ in federal court: FRCP 4(k)(1)(A)
- Is general jurisdiction for PJ the same thing as what is meant by the term “court of general jurisdiction” in FRCP 4(k)(1)(A)?
- In Florida state court, one would analyze PJ using the Florida long-arm statute and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. How would one analyze PJ in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida? See FRCP 4(k)(1)(A).
- Most assertions of PJ in federal court are governed by FRCP 4(k)(1)(A). Does this rule help to encourage, or to avoid, forum-shopping between state and federal court? Why?
Federal court only: the federal long-arm: FRCP 4(k)(2)
- What are the elements of PJ under FRCP 4(k)(2)? Articulate them. Give an example.
- Can FRCP 4(k)(2) jurisdiction exist when FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) is satisfied in some state?
- Can FRCP 4(k)(2) be used to establish PJ if the cause of action is based on state law?
- Can FRCP 4(k)(2) be used in state court? Why or why not?
Federal court only: bulge (FRCP 4(k)(1)(B)) and statutory jurisdiction (FRCP 4(k)(1)(A))
- Authorized by statute. Note that FRCP 4(k)(1)(C) permits a federal court to exercise PJ when authorized by a federal statute. Here’s an example we’ll address later this semester: 28 U.S.C. 2631, which permits nationwide service of process (nationwide PJ) in in lawsuits asserting “statutory interpleader.”
- Bulge jurisdiction. FRCP 4(k)(1)(B) is known as the “bulge” rule. Suppose an accident occurs in Tallahassee, Florida. The victim sues the other driver, who is a citizen of Georgia. The suit is filed in federal court in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, located in Tallahassee. In that same lawsuit, the defendant then files a third-party complaint, seeking contribution from a tire shop located in southern Georgia that sold the defendant tires. (This is similar to how Cheng Shin asserted a claim in the Asahi case, although that case was filed in California state court.) The Georgia tire shop, located 57 miles from the Tallahassee federal courthouse, does no business in Florida, has no advertising in Florida, and has never sold tires to any Florida citizen. The tire shop has no contacts with Florida whatsoever. Is there personal jurisdiction over the Georgia tire shop? See the bulge rule.
- Suppose the lawsuit in the question above was filed in Florida state court rather than Florida federal court? Is there PJ?
Revised, expanded, and consolidated with other materials Aug. 25, 2016